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C hanges in the global economy and technological advances are stimulating increased geographic distribution of newproduct design and development efforts. For large organizations that design and develop complex products, this
geographic distribution has added a new layer of complexity to product development operations. In this empirical study
of a large auto manufacturer, we examine the operational performance implications of splitting the design of vehicle
subsystems across multiple geographic locations. Our results indicate that global distribution diminishes the chance of
completing tasks on time and degrades subsystem design quality. Finally, by examining the interplay between subsystem
centrality and global distribution, we found that higher centrality in the product architecture amplifies the impact of glo-
bal distribution on subsystem error rates.
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1. Introduction and Literature Review
Geographic distribution of knowledge-intensive work
is a widespread phenomenon in the global economy.
Companies are increasingly internationalizing their
R&D activites (Brockhoff 1998). Open source software
such as Linux and Apache is being developed by
programming communities that circle the globe
(Fuggetta 2003). New product development (NPD) is
following manufacturing in being outsourced to inter-
nal and external suppliers around the globe (Eppinger
and Chitkara 2006). In a survey of 103 new product
development firms, 54 had used or were using global
teams for some of their NPD efforts (McDonough
et al. 2001). The Wall Street Journal recently reported:
“Ford Motor Co. is reorganizing its design and engi-
neering centers in a move to make the company more
global while speeding vehicle development. … The
engineering centers, located in different regions
throughout the world, will be responsible for devel-
opment of such components as engines and chassis.”
(Bennett 2008). But globalization of design processes
also presents risks. For example, Boeing made a
“quantum leap in farming out the design and manu-
facture of crucial components” (Hiltzik 2011) for its
landmark Dreamliner 787 by collaborating with
around 40 global partners on the majority of the air-
craft’s design (Stackpole 2007), but wound up “bil-
lions of dollars over-budget, and years behind
schedule” (Ray 2011).
Nonetheless, there are several potential benefits
from geographically distributed product develop-
ment, including (i) reducing labor costs, (ii) acquiring
technical expertise, (iii) gaining access to local mar-
kets by incorporating diverse customer values from
different cultures, and (iv) increasing efficiency by
conducting round-the-clock operation (Hinds and
Kiesler 1998). Beyond these, two key trends have
stimulated distributed NPD over the past two dec-
ades. One is political, with the opening of many new
labor markets to the global economy (Johnston 1991).
The other is technological, as CAD systems and col-
laborative project management software have made it
possible to divide design work among distributed
teams and coordinate their activities (Leonardi and
Bailey 2008).
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Managing geographically distributed product devel-
opment to achieve these benefits while avoiding the
risks poses a number of questions about the decision
to distribute NPD work, including the following:
under what conditions and how should companies
distribute their NPD work? Do the challenges and
problems associated with globally distributed work
offset the benefits? Which metrics should be used to
evaluate the process of work distribution? These
questions are particularly challenging for large orga-
nizations that develop large and complex products
(e.g., airplanes, automobiles). Given their size and
market reach, the critical decision for them is not
whether to distribute the design work or not, but
rather how to distribute this knowledge-intensive
work in the most effective manner. This raises addi-
tional questions. Which parts of the product (e.g.,
architectural subsystems) should be distributed? Are
some subsystems easier to manage and design across
geographic boundaries? What is the role of architec-
tural interdependencies in managing global design?
In this study, we make use of a large archival data set
of the engineering design system of a global auto
manufacturer to provide empirical insights into these
important questions.
Although it is a relatively new practice, scholars
have begun to study distributed NPD from a variety
of perspectives, including cross-border knowledge
transfer (Subramaniam 2006), the role of team mem-
ber dispersion on teamwork quality and perfor-
mance (Hoegl et al. 2007), and the use of virtual
global teams (Harvey and Griffith 2007). The tradi-
tional “make–buy” decision has been expanded to
include product design as well as conventional pro-
duction decisions (Ulrich and Ellison 2005). Other
studies have considered the effect of learning in
product design over time (Anderson and Parker
2002) and the role of uncertainty (i.e., market, crea-
tive, and process) in NPD planning (Anderson and
Joglekar 2005). Although Baldwin and Clark (2000)
suggested that outsourcing the components is benefi-
cial to a firm due to increased competition among
suppliers, Novak and Eppinger (2001) argued that
when the designed product is highly complex, in-
house production is preferable due to coordination
advantages. Parker and Anderson (2002) suggested
that, although outsourcing significant portions of
product development may provide competitive
advantage, coordinating these outsourced parts
could create new challenges in product development
as well as in procurement along the supply chain.
More recently, Anderson et al. (2007) outlined a
number of specific impacts of distributed product
development on the search, selection, transformation,
and coordination processes involved in new product
development.
Our work diverges from these studies in two major
ways: first, instead of examining a high level make–
buy decision, which is related to both design and pro-
duction, we focus specifically on in-house engineering
design within a large global organization. Although
much attention has been given to outsourcing and its
consequences, tactical issues resulting from globaliza-
tion of in-house product development have received
comparatively little attention (Krishnan and Loch
2005). Second, unlike most of the work in this stream,
which treats critical decisions such as outsourcing or
off-shoring as binary (e.g., either make or buy a part,
either offshore a task or not), we consider partial off-
shoring of interconnected subsystems.
To study partial distribution of in-house engineer-
ing design, we must break products into their con-
stituent parts. The literature on “modularity” does
this. Modularity refers to “a special form of design
which intentionally creates a high degree of inde-
pendence or ‘loose coupling’ between component
designs by standardizing component interface speci-
fications” (Sanchez and Mahoney 1996). Researchers
have pointed out the organizational benefits of
product modularity in managing complex product
interdependencies (Baldwin and Clark 2000, Schil-
ling and Steensma 2001, Ulrich and Pearson 1998).
Product modularity has also been examined from a
knowledge-based view of the firm as a driver of
modular organization structures. For example, by
associating a modular organization structure with a
modular product architecture, Sanchez and Maho-
ney (1996) used modularity as a framework for
more effective knowledge management and strate-
gic learning. Using a simulation study, Ethiraj and
Levinthal (2004) examined the trade-offs between
overly refined modularization and excess levels of
integration. The most developed approach for
matching the organization to a modular product
structure is the Design Structure Matrix (DSM)
methodology (Eppinger et al. 1994). In this study,
we go beyond the qualitative analysis of DSM to
quantify the level of interdependencies between
architectural subsystems by using a network-based
approach based on social network theory (Wasser-
man and Faust 1994). We then investigate both the
direct effect of architectural interdependencies (i.e.,
position of a subsystem in the product architecture
network) on the on-time performance of NPD work
as well as its moderating effect on the relationship
between global distribution of an architectural sub-
system and the accuracy of NPD work. In a recent
study (Gokpinar et al. 2010), we found that mis-
alignment of organizational communication and
product architecture is correlated with final product
quality (i.e., warranty claims). In this study, we use
the same data source but have collected entirely
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new data (i.e., for global vehicle programs rather
than domestic vehicle programs) and have focused
on different research questions pertaining to
whether globalization introduces inefficiencies on
global product design process. Consequently, while
Gokpinar et al. (2010) focused on the product, this
study is about the process. More specifically, in this
study, we investigate the effects of in-house globally
distributed design on two key process performance
measures: process time (task delay) and process
quality (subsystem error rates).
Much of the literature that deals with distributed
work focuses on the organization rather than on the
product. Issues such as culture, language, identity,
conflict, and trust in geographically distributed teams
have been examined in great detail in the organi-
zations literature (Armstrong and Cole 1998, Hinds
and Kiesler 1998, 2005, Jarvenpaa and Leidner
1999). Researchers have examined the role of geo-
graphic location on knowledge flow in organizations
and have found that as the geographic distance
between individuals increases, transmitting knowl-
edge becomes more difficult (Allen 1977) or, equiva-
lently, as the proximity increases, transmitting
knowledge becomes easier (Saxenian 1994). Focusing
on geographic distance within an organization, Han-
sen and Lovas (2004) showed that the negative effect
of geographic distance (in the form of spatial, cultural,
and national differentiation) can be offset by informal
relationships of subsidiaries. At the organizational
level, Bell and Zaheer (2007) differentiated between
institutional and organizational ties and found that
institutional-level ties act as knowledge transmitters if
they are geographically proximate, whereas organiza-
tional ties do not show this property regardless of
proximity. Our study contributes to the organiza-
tional literature on geographically distributed work
by (i) introducing product architecture as a major fac-
tor in knowledge transmission across different geo-
graphic locations and (ii) empirically examining the
moderating effect of product architecture on the rela-
tionship between global distribution of NPD tasks
and performance.
From an operational standpoint, two key product
performance metrics in all product development
systems are speed and accuracy. The speed of the
process matters because it affects time to market,
while the accuracy of the process matters because it
can impact speed (e.g., by avoiding task rework) as
well as final product quality. Because, as we noted
earlier in the context of the Boeing 787 program,
global distribution of product development can
potentially have a major impact on both speed and
accuracy, researchers have begun to try to under-
stand the nature of the impacts. For example, in an
empirical study on globally distributed software
development, Herbsleb and Mockus (2003) surveyed
engineers on how often their work is delayed. They
found that distributed work tasks take about two
and a half times as long to complete as similar tasks
where all the work is colocated. Also in a field
study in geographically distributed software teams,
Espinosa et al. (2007) addressed both speed and
accuracy by studying time to complete an error-free
project as a measure of team performance. For a dis-
cussion of development time and a list of other
studies that use it as a performance measure, see
Gerwin and Barrowman (2002). In this study, we
focus on the automotive industry, in which the
larger teams, longer development times, and physi-
cal components involved in vehicle development
make the process quite different from software
development. In our study, we address the issues of
speed and accuracy via separate metrics. We con-
sider speed by evaluating on-time compliance with
task due dates. We consider accuracy by developing
an error rate metric that compares the number of
task errors to the total number of tasks.
In section 2, we develop the theoretical basis for our
model and present our hypotheses. We then provide
the details of our setting and describe our data set
and research methodology in section 3. We present
the models, analysis, and results of the empirical
study in section 4, and we conclude with a discussion
of our findings, their implications, and potential
directions for further research in section 5.
2. Theory and Hypotheses
Global distribution of work affects knowledge flow
and performance within organizations through
several mechanisms: first, there is a cost associated
with coordinating activities in multiple locations.
Geographic distance reduces informal and spontane-
ous conversation opportunities (Allen 1977) and con-
ferences (Audretsch 2003, von Hippel 1994). While
members of physically proximate teams often enjoy
social similarity, shared values, and expectations (La-
tane et al. 1995), members of globally distributed
teams may find it more difficult to establish such har-
monious social environments (Kraut et al. 1998).
Taken as a whole, the research in this literature sug-
gests that, as the number of geographically distrib-
uted teams involved in a task increases, the increased
difficulty of coordinating activities will tend to nega-
tively impact the time to complete a task. Whether or
not this tendency negatively affects due date perfor-
mance depends on whether or not management prop-
erly accounts for the added complexity of
coordinating a geographically distributed team when
setting due dates. Because the effects are subtle and
global design practices are new, we conjecture that
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managers are likely to be overly optimistic. This leads
to our first hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 1. All else being equal, the higher the num-
ber of global sites involved in a design task, the greater
the chance of delay in the task relative to its due date.
This hypothesis has great managerial significance
because of the importance of speed in product design.
Failure to complete tasks on time can compromise the
timeliness of product launches. Many studies have
emphasized the importance of speed in the product
development process (Stalk and Hout 1990). In addi-
tion to the well-publicized delays of the Dreamliner
787, which have cost Boeing billions, there are many
examples of costly product launch delays. For exam-
ple, delays of the Nintendo 3DS caused it to miss the
2010 holiday shopping season, resulting in a $1.1 bil-
lion downgrade in estimates of annual profits by
Nintendo (Soble 2010).
In addition to speed, accuracy is the other key mea-
sure of product development performance. Unless
tasks are completed without errors, products will not
meet design specifications. This is because (i) errors
during the design process may lead to quality prob-
lems in the end product and/or (ii) corrective actions
in response to errors mean additional costs and loss
of valuable time for design engineers. Therefore, we
consider the error rate (as defined in section 3.2) as a
key performance measure. A design process with
both low delay and low error rate is needed to bring
high quality, competitively priced products to cus-
tomers in a timely fashion.
An important way in which organizations avoid
errors is through knowledge sharing (Cummings
2004, Haas 2006). For example, researchers have
found that production networks (users, suppliers,
manufacturers) with superior knowledge-sharing
mechanisms out innovate firms with less effective
knowledge-sharing mechanisms (von Hippel 1998),
and investment in knowledge sharing routines
between firms is a potential source of competitive
advantage (Dyer and Singh 1998). However, studies
have also found that transmission of knowledge
within organizations is negatively affected by geo-
graphic distance between individuals (Allen 1977).
In order to successfully perform their tasks within
an organization, it is necessary for individuals to
have both specific knowledge pertaining to their
individual tasks and knowledge of other tasks with
which their tasks interact. For example, in a prod-
uct development environment, the designer of one
component must know about the designs of other
components with which his/her component has
physical and/or logical interfaces. Geographic dis-
tance may hinder transfer of knowledge about
related tasks and thereby lead to higher error rates
for highly distributed subsystems.
Beyond knowledge transfer issues, research has
shown that projects involving team members from
different sites experience higher levels of conflict,
which is detrimental to performance (Hinds and
Bailey 2003). When accumulated over the many inter-
dependent projects and tasks involved in developing
a product, the impact of individual conflicts could be
quite substantial. Therefore, we expect higher levels
of conflict, and hence higher rates of error, to arise in
subsystems that are more globally distributed than in
those concentrated within a small number of sites.
Media richness is essential to the quality of commu-
nication (Daft and Lengel 1986). The three major com-
munication means for product development activities,
ordered by their media richness, are physical meet-
ings, telephone calls, and electronic mail (Anderson
et al. 2004). Geographic distance may reduce the like-
lihood of physical meetings, and language differences
may reduce the likelihood of telephone calls (Ander-
son et al. 2007), both of which could lead to reduced
media richness and hence lower communication qual-
ity. Furthermore, geographic distance not only
reduces the communication frequency, but it also
results in substitution of media-rich physical meetings
by inferior telephone or email communications (Sosa
et al. 2002). Consequently, reduced communication
frequency and lower communication quality experi-
enced in geographically distributed subsystems may
lead to higher error rates in these subsystems.
Taken together, knowledge transmission, conflict
problems, and communication issues can be expected
to result in lower performance in globally distributed
subsystems. Hence, we hypothesize the following.
HYPOTHESIS 2. All else being equal, the greater the glo-
bal distribution of a subsystem, the higher the error rate
for that subsystem.
Ulrich (1995) defines product architecture as “the
scheme by which the function of a product is allocated
to physical components” and argues that product
architecture is important in managerial decision mak-
ing because it is a key driver of a firm’s performance.
In contrast, a component is defined as a “physically
distinct portion of the product that embodies a core
design concept and performs a well-defined function”
(Henderson and Clark 1990). Decoupling and indepen-
dence of these components in the product architecture
is at the heart of modularity (Baldwin and Clark 2000),
which can facilitate significant flexibility in managing
architectural complexities in both product develop-
ment (Sanchez and Mahoney 1996, Schilling and
Steensma 2001) and software development (Mac-
Cormack 2001, MacCormack et al. 2006). While a
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modularity perspective is helpful in conceptualizing
architectural complexities, a complex networks
approach is useful in quantifying and measuring
these complexities.
For managerial purposes, many design organiza-
tions use the word “subsystem” to describe a subset
of the product architecture which includes a group of
components that collectively perform a higher level
function. In a vehicle, examples of subsystems include
“front suspension,” “steering wheel,” “door trim,”
“front seat,” etc. These subsystems have many physi-
cal interfaces and functional dependencies among
their constituent components. If we characterize sub-
systems as nodes of a network and link them accord-
ing to the intensity of interdependencies between
them, we can create a product architecture network. A
subsystem with high centrality in the product archi-
tecture network is one that has many interdependen-
cies with other subsystems.
Because the interdependencies between subsystems
demand coordination and hence present opportunities
for errors, we expect a subsystemwhich is heavily con-
nected to other subsystems in the product architecture
network to be more prone to potential design errors. In
fact, in a recent study (Gokpinar et al. 2010), we
observed that internal errors (i.e., design problems)
tend to increase as subsystem centrality increases. But,
because resources dedicated to these problems also
increase with centrality and these resources can offset
internal errors, we found an inverted U-shaped rela-
tionship between subsystem centrality and external
errors (i.e., warranty claims). This leads us to expect a
positive association between product network central-
ity and error rates. Thus, we conjecture:
HYPOTHESIS 3. All else being equal, the higher the cen-
trality of a subsystem in the product architecture net-
work, the higher the error rate for that subsystem.
A successful product development project requires
substantial collaboration among project group mem-
bers, such as exchanging information and jointly solv-
ing design related problems (Brown and Eisenhardt
1995). Coordination of subsystems whose compo-
nents are designed across multiple sites is more diffi-
cult due to increased geographic distance and
knowledge transmission difficulties. We expect these
coordination issues to have a deleterious effect on
product development performance. We refer to this
as the “coordination burden” imposed by geographic
distribution of a task. On the other hand, when a firm
distributes its product development efforts, it gains
freedom in task assignments. In a manner similar
to many strategic partnerships, offshoring, and
outsourcing arrangements (Jarillo 1988, Metters 2008,
Venkatraman 2004) in which firms capitalize on the
expertise of specialists, we expect to see subsystems
to be assigned to those locations with the highest com-
petence (e.g., better technical and labor resources).
If this is the case, then we should see a positive associ-
ation between global distribution and product devel-
opment performance. We call this the “specialization
benefit.” Therefore, our conjecture is that global distri-
bution has two effects on the error rate: the “coordina-
tion burden,” which increases the error rate, and the
“specialization benefit,” which reduces the error rate.
We expect the coordination burden to increase in sub-
system centrality, but we expect the specialization
benefit to remain relatively constant in subsystem
centrality. Hence, we conjecture that the “coordina-
tion burden” will dominate in high centrality subsys-
tems and cause the error rate to increase in the global
distribution score. However, in low centrality subsys-
tems, we expect the “specialization benefit” to domi-
nate and cause the error rate to decrease in the global
distribution score. This leads to our final hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 4. Higher centrality in the product
architecture network will amplify the relationship between
global distribution score of subsystems and their error
rates.
3. Data and Model Development
To test the above hypotheses, we conducted an
empirical study of the vehicle development process
of a global auto manufacturer. An automobile is a
complex product made up of a large number of com-
ponents, processes, and functions. The process of
developing a new car involves thousands of people
working on thousands of interdependent tasks for
many months at multiple locations. These characteris-
tics make the development of a new car an excellent
area in which to study management of product devel-
opment (Clark and Fujimoto 1991). Our study is
based on a large archival database of “Engineering
Change Orders (ECOs).” ECOs are “part of almost
every development process” (Terwiesch and Loch
1999), and they are used extensively in industry to
administer and document complex product develop-
ment projects. Several researchers have described the
central role of ECOs in product development efforts
(Clark and Fujimoto 1991, Huang and Mak 1999, Loch
and Terwiesch 1999).
We spent several months on site to observe and
understand the NPD process and to collect and verify
the necessary data. Fortunately, recent advances in
computer technologies and data storage capabilities
have allowed firms to manage and store large
amounts of data related to the NPD process. To our
knowledge, this study and that in Gokpinar et al.
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(2010) are the first to make use of an ECO database to
study product development networks. This study is
the first to do so in a globally distributed context.
As product design is an iterative process, many
changes are made to parts, drawings, interfaces, etc.
during the development of a vehicle. All of these iter-
ations are captured via ECOs. An ECO may indicate a
design related problem or mistake, but it may also
indicate other issues and transactions as well. For
example, other reasons for issuing ECOs include
initial release of a part, changes in part specifications
due to government regulations or cost-reduction
initiatives, and styling changes in response to market-
ing initiatives. For each ECO, the reason for issuance
is indicated by selecting the required reason code
from a drop-down menu. There are approximately 40
reason codes in the system. In addition to the reason
code, an ECO contains a rich set of data, including the
location it was issued, engineers who are involved
with it, part numbers associated with it, other parts
that are affected by the change, and the targeted and
actual dates of completion. Our client makes use of a
computerized ECO system accessible by design engi-
neers in all of its engineering design sites across the
globe. This system facilitates formal communication
and collaboration among design engineers at multiple
locations.
To facilitate our analysis, we divided ECOs into
three subsets according to their reason codes: (i) new
release ECOs, which are issued for all parts of new
models, including both new parts and re-used old
parts with new part numbers, (ii) problematic ECOs,
which indicate a design-related error, (iii) other ECOs,
which include all other ECOs that are neither new
release nor problematic (e.g., ECOs due to exogenous
changes in government regulations or styling).
The data set we collected contains the entire set
of ECO transactions for four global vehicle pro-
grams that were developed in multiple design
centers around the world and launched in the 2006
model year. These ECOs were issued between 2002
and 2005. We point out that a vehicle program pro-
vides the platform for several models, which may
be sold under different brand names in different
countries. The four vehicle programs we investi-
gated resulted in 11 new car models. For the four
vehicle programs we studied, the ECO database
included 28,540 ECOs that represented computer-
ized records for almost 2,000 design engineers from
10 engineering design centers (all of which are
located in different countries, including the United
States, Canada, Mexico, England, and others) work-
ing on nearly 40,000 parts. These engineers were
responsible for creating and modifying the parts,
making sure they meet design specifications and
coordinating interfaces with other parts.
To test our hypotheses, we analyzed this system at
two different levels. First, to test Hypothesis 1 about
the impact of global distribution on the on-time per-
formance of NPD tasks, we studied the system at the
level of individual tasks. Then, to test Hypotheses 2,
3, and 4, we studied the system at the level of architec-
tural subsystems. We did this by following our
client’s practice of dividing the vehicle into 243 archi-
tectural subsystems, and then evaluating the impact
of various factors on error rates in the development of
these subsystems. We summarize our results below.
3.1. On-Time Performance Model
Because global design efforts involve tasks that are
performed in multiple global locations, we first create
a model to examine the relationship between global
distribution of a task and its on-time performance.
We regard each ECO as a design task, of which there
are 28,540 in the four vehicle programs we studied.
As we are interested in on-time performance at the
task level, we develop our model at the ECO level.
We do this by defining the following variables.
3.1.1. Dependent Variable: ECO Lateness. We
measured on-time performance by using data from all
types of ECOs. As we noted earlier, when an ECO is
initiated by a design engineer, a target completion
date is set by the product development managers. If it
is completed on or before the due date, it is called
on-time; if not, it is called late. ECO lateness is a keymet-
ric to assess the performance of NPD efforts at the task
level. We measured lateness with a binary metric,
which takes the value of 0 if the ECO is completed on
time and 1 if it is late. We used this binary metric
instead of the more conventional continuous defini-
tion of lateness (i.e., completion date minus due date)
for two reasons. First, ECOs differ in terms of com-
plexity, the number of people and parts involved, and
other factors that could affect time to completion.
Being one day late on a task that was allotted one week
to complete is not comparable to being one day late on
a task that was allotted one month to complete. Sec-
ond, during our on-site observations, we noticed that
for ECOs that were already late, some design engi-
neers did not close them immediately when they were
completed, but instead waited for several late ECOs to
be completed and then closed them all together (pre-
sumably for paperwork economies of scale). This
means that for some of the late ECOs, their closing
date may not accurately reflect their actual completion
date. Consequently, using a continous metric such
“absolute lateness” or “percent lateness” could have
biased our results. However, as engineers were evalu-
ated on on-time performance and hence had substan-
tial incentive to report completed ECOs as finished by
their due date (i.e., while they might report a late ECO
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as later than it actually was, they would not report an
on-time ECO as late), our binary lateness metric is not
biased. Moreover, the fact that our client used it as a
measure of timeliness gives us confidence that it is a
metric of practical significance.
3.1.2. Independent Variable: Number of Global
Sites. As described in the previous section, when an
ECO is issued, all related parts and engineers that will
be affected by this change are listed in the ECO. An
ECO cannot be completed before getting a sign off
from all of the affected engineers, who may be spread
over multiple sites. We define the number of global sites
for an ECO as the total number of different locations
of engineers listed on that ECO. Our client has 10
locations in 10 countries for engineering design, so
this measure has a range from 1 to 10.
3.1.3. Control Variables. Although our main vari-
able of interest is the number of global sites associated
with an ECO, other factors may influence on-time per-
formance. Therefore, we control for the following
factors.
Number of parts. This represents the total number of
parts listed in an ECO, which may be an indicator for
the complexity of the ECO task. Number of design engi-
neers. This is the total number of design engineers
listed on the ECO, which may negatively affect on-
time performance due to communication and signoff
delays. Planned duration of the ECO. This variable is
calculated by subtracting the initiation date from the
completion date. The planned duration of the project
may be a proxy for the complexity of the task, or it
may be the result of the high number of global sites.
Nevertheless, we control for this potentially signifi-
cant effect.
Indicator for the system management group. Our client
divides a vehicle into six major system management
groups (e.g., Chassis, Electrical, Powertrain). Each
ECO is “owned” by one of these system manage-
ment groups. As on-time performance may differ
across groups, we controlled for it by using 61 = 5
indicator variables. Note that in the analysis we used
“Body” as the reference category, as it is the least
specialized system in terms of the nature of tasks
and consequently has the least variation in task
times.
Indicator for the originator country. Although there
are clear definitions and guidelines of the process, the
practice of initiating an ECO and following it up may
differ slightly across different locations, so we control
for the originator country of the ECO by using
10  1 = 9 indicator variables. Note that we do not
examine specific pairs of countries, so we treat each
different country as an individual and equal cate-
gory.
Indicator for the vehicle program. Issuing an ECO and
setting the due dates may also be influenced by the
vehicle program it belongs to. Therefore we control
for the vehicle programs using 4  1 = 3 indicator
variables.
Indicator for the ECO type. Type of the ECO could
also have an impact on the likelihood of being late.
So, we also control for ECO type (new release, prob-
lematic, other) by using 3  1 = 2 dummies.
3.2. Error-Rate Model
We now turn from speed to accuracy. While we could
evaluate on-time completion at the ECO level, it does
not make sense to evaluate accuracy at the ECO level
because of the coordination requirements between
compnents and hence tasks. Hence, to evaluate
process accuracy, we shift our level of analysis to the
subsystem level. We develop our model by defining
the following variables.
3.2.1. Dependent Variable: Error Rate. Design
tasks are documented via ECOs. Hence, each ECO
can be viewed as an opportunity for error. Ideally,
each task should be completed correctly the first time.
But because errors occur, corrective actions are
required; these are documented as problematic ECOs.
The fraction of ECOs for a subsystem that are prob-
lematic therefore constitutes an error rate, which
serves as a measure of the accuracy (quality) of the
design process for that subsystem. We define the error
rate1 for a subsystem as
Note that, in the above equation, the number of
problematic ECOs plus the number of new release
ECOs plus the number of other ECOs is equal to the
total number of ECOs.
3.2.2. Independent Variables: Product Architec-
ture Network Centrality. We created a product archi-
tecture network at the subsystem level in the same
manner as Gokpinar et al. (2010). Specifically, we
defined each subsystem as a node and established
weighted links between pairs of nodes by counting
the number of co-appearances of two subsystems in
the same new-release ECO. Note that we only made
use of new-release ECOs to characterize architectural
linkage of parts, because they are issued to initiate all
Error rate ¼ number of problematic ECOs
number of new release ECOsþ number of problematic ECOsþ number of other ECOs : ð1Þ
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parts for a new vehicle program and are not
influenced by problems or exogenous changes.
Because all parts that have a physical or a functional
interface with a given part are listed in that part’s
new-release ECO, we can get a proxy for the strength
of the architectural relationship between two subsys-
tems by counting the number of times they have parts
that are named in the same new-release ECO.
After creating the product architecture network, we
calculated the degree centrality for each node (i.e., sub-
system) by using UCINET 6 (Borgatti et al. 2002). This
is computed as the sum of the weighted links emanat-
ing from the node. Degree centrality measures the
strength of the architectural connectivity of a subsys-
tem with the rest of the subsystems.
Global distribution score. We calculated the global
distribution of each subsystem by making use of
individual ECOs in that subsystem. As we described
in Section 3.1, we can identify the number of global
sites for each ECO. With these, we calculated the glo-
bal distribution of a subsystem by calculating the
weighted average of all ECOs in that subsystem. That
is, if a subsystem has 100 ECOs, of which 20 are asso-
ciated with one engineering design site, 30 are associ-
ated with two sites, 40 are associated with three sites,
and 10 are associated with four sites, then the global
distribution score for this subsystem is [(20 9 1) +
(30 9 2) + (40 9 3) + (10 9 4)]/100 = 2.4.
3.2.3. Control Variables. Other factors that may
be associated with subsystem error rate are the fol-
lowing:
Number of parts. As in the previous section, this
represents the total number of parts in a sub-
system, which may be a proxy for the size or
complexity of the subsystem.
Fraction of new parts. This is the fraction of new
parts (as opposed to reused parts from an older
model) in a subsystem, which may a proxy for
overall task difficulty in that subsystem.
Number of design engineers. As in the previous
section, this is the total number of design engi-
neers that are listed in the ECOs of a subsys-
tem, which may be a proxy for the complexity
of that subsystem.
Number of ECOs. This is the total number of
ECOs in a subsystem, which could be an indi-
cator of the size or complexity of a subsystem.
Fraction of late ECOs. This represents the frac-
tion of ECOs associated with a subsystem that
are not completed by their specified due date.
This measure could be an indicator of overall
task difficulty in a subsystem.
Indicator for vehicle program. Subsystem error
rates may differ across different vehicle pro-
grams. So, we introduced three indicator
variables for the four global vehicle programs
we studied.2
4. Analysis and Results
In this section, we present our analyses of the above
models and discuss the results. We use our on-time
performance model (at the ECO level) to test Hypoth-
esis 1 in section 4.1 and then test Hypotheses 2–4
using the error rate model (at the subsystem level) in
section 4.2.
4.1. On-Time Performance Analysis
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and correlations
for the ECO-level (i.e., task-level) variables. Note that
about 17% of the ECOs in our data set were com-
pleted late. ECOs are associated on average with
2.87 global sites. The highest correlation is 0.236
(p < 0.001), which is between number of global sites
and ECO lateness, and the relationship is in the pre-
dicted direction. This indicates that our estimation is
unlikely to be affected by any serious multicollineari-
ty problem.
Because the dependent variable (ECO lateness) is
dichotomous (i.e., 1 if late, 0 if on-time), we used
logistic regression, which is based on the maximum
likelihood method. That is, our model predicts the
likelihood of ECOs being late for completion. We first
checked for multicollinearity by calculating variance
inflation factors. They were all less than seven, which
suggested that multicollinearity is not a serious threat
to our analysis. We also analyzed residuals (studen-
tized, the deviance residual, and the leverage) and
concluded that our results are not biased by influen-
tial points.
Table 2 presents the results for a hierarchical logis-
tic regression at the ECO level. We removed insignifi-
cant country indicators from the final model. The
slopes estimated in a logistic regression are the natu-
ral log of the odds ratio, and, therefore, a positive logit
indicates a positive association between the indepen-
dent variable and the likelihood that the binary
dependent variable equals one. The sign of the coeffi-
cient of our main variable of interest, the number of
global sites, is positive and significant, which supports
Hypothesis 1.
Model 1a provides the results with all variables
except the number of global sites, while Model 1b pre-
sents the final model after adding the number of global
sites as an explanatory variable. The likelihood ratio
test suggests that both models are significant at the
1% level (v2 ¼ 32:65 and v2 ¼ 36:77; p\ 0:001). Also
note that, when the number of global sites is included in
Model 1b, the likelihood ratio v2 increases from 41.16
to 45.53. The increase between the v2 values of the two
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models (45.53  41.16 = 4.37) is also significant at the
0.05 level with p = 0.036 < 0.05 (1 df), which indicates
that adding the number of global sites improves the
model significantly. Also, although the interpretation
of the pseudo R2 in a logit model is not the same as an
OLS model (i.e., it does not explain the variation in
the dependent variable), it is a widely used goodness-
of-fit measure for logit models, and we observed an
increase from 0.172 in Model 1a to 0.191 in Model 1b.
The simplest interpretation of Model 1b is that, for
every unit increase in the number of global sites, the
odds of an ECO being late increases by a factor of
e0:3237 ¼ 1:382 units (i.e., the odds ratio is equal to
1.382). While reporting odds is a common practice,
this is not the most intuitive way to interpret the
impact of globally distributed design in a probabilistic
sense. Consequently, in order to better understand
the relationship between the number of global sites
and the likelihood of an ECO being late, we also
examined the marginal effect of the number of global
sites on ECO lateness, which varies with the value of
all other explanatory variables. For each observation,
as suggested by Hoetker (2007), we first calculated the
response (i.e., ECO lateness) and then averaged these
responses. We computed the marginal effect of the
number of global sites on ECO lateness to be equal to
0.035 (p < 0.01). This implies that adding one site to
the number of global sites would increase the probabil-
ity of late completion of an ECO by 3.5%.
Both the number of design engineers and planned
duration of an ECO are significant and positively asso-

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2 Logit Model for ECO Lateness
Variable Model 1a Model 1b
Number of parts 0.0055 (0.0052) 0.0051 (0.0048)
Number of design
engineers
0.0111** (0.0052) 0.0115** (0.0054)
Planned duration of
the ECO
0.0092* (0.0051) 0.0088* (0.0049)
ECO dummy—
New release
0.2156*** (0.0391) 0.2109*** (0.0410)
ECO dummy—
Problematic
0.3730*** (0.0463) 0.3752*** (0.0469)
System dummy—
Electrical
0.4614** (0.2137) 0.4599** (0.2130)
System dummy—
Powertrain
0.2982* (0.1704) 0.2978* (0.1700)
System dummy—Chassis 0.1187 (0.0848) 0.1208 (0.0866)
System dummy—Interior 0.0965 (0.0803) 0.0958 (0.0819)
System dummy—Exterior 0.1926 (0.1750) 0.1937 (0.1792)
Country dummy—USA 0.4870*** (0.1691) 0.4867*** (0.1682)
Number of global sites 0.3237*** (0.0889)
Likelihood ratio
Chi-square
41.16*** (11 df) 45.53*** (12 df)
McFadden pseudo R2 0.172 0.191
n 28,540
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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surprising, as both of these variables may be indica-
tors of the complexity or difficulty of an ECO. Also,
out of the six system indicator variables, only electri-
cal and powertrain systems are significant and posi-
tively associated with ECO lateness relative to others.
This is consistent with the intuition of senior design
engineers, who suggested that these two systems are
significantly more complex, and, hence, ECOs in these
systems are more likely to be late than ECOs in the
other systems, such as body or chassis. An interesting
finding is that ECOs originated in the United States
have a higher likelihood of being completed on time
(i.e., as this variable is significant with a negative
coefficient).3 This may be due to the fact that the ECO
system has been employed in the United States longer
than in other countries, so experiencemay have played
a role. Also, as the United States is the main center for
engineering design, with almost half of the entire glo-
bal design operations, ECOs originated in the United
States may have been resolved more efficiently by
using the technical resources available at this location.
To ensure robustness of our findings, we investi-
gated potential endogeneity issues and alternative
explanations to our results at the task (ECO) level. For
example, it can be argued that lateness of ECOs may
increase the number of engineers or change the loca-
tions, rather than the reverse as argued in the study,
which would constitute a reverse causation problem.
We think that this form of endogeneity is not a serious
threat here because of the unique process by which
these ECOs are created and used in the design organi-
zation we studied. ECO’s are created by design engi-
neers, and a target completion date is set by product
development managers. If an ECO is late, the typical
managerial action is to first investigate the reason
behind this lateness and then put some pressure on
the people involved with that ECO (who are already
listed in that ECO’s distribution list). It is not practical
to use additional people or change the location of an
ECO once its lateness is realized. Such changes would
only delay the completion of the ECO further. Conse-
quently, the people associated with an ECO and the
global sites associated with it are determined at the
beginning of the ECO process (much earlier than a
potential lateness is realized). This clearly rules out a
reverse causation explanation of our results.
4.2. Error Rate Analysis
Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics and correla-
tions for the subsystem-level variables. The highest
correlation between any of the two explanatory vari-
ables is 0.295, which is between the number of design
engineers and the number of ECOs. Again, this suggests
that multicollinearity should not be a problem. We
note that both global distribution score and product net-
work centrality have positive correlations with the error
rate, as expected. In order to examine the association
between these variables and error rate, we constructed
a regression model. We analyzed the studentized
residuals to examine outliers, which did not indicate
any problems. We also tested for multicollinearity by
calculating variance inflation factors (VIF’s) for each
of the variables. We found that they are all less than
four, which confirms that multicollinearity is not a
threat to our analyses. We also checked for heteroske-
dasticity in two ways. First, we examined the plot of
residuals vs. independent variables. We observed that
residuals are roughly similar in terms of size (width),
which suggests that there is no serious heteroskedas-
ticity threat. Next, we performed White’s test (White
1980) and calculated the chi-squared statistic to be
7.32, which is smaller than v2ð6Þ ¼ 12:59, so the
homoskedasticity assumption is not rejected.
We exploited the panel structure of our data set by
making use of the four global vehicle programs we
studied. Specifically, because each vehicle program
has 243 subsystems, we were able to observe the
cross-section of these 243 subsystems four times (one
observation per vehicle program). Considering the
panel structure of the data, our hypotheses could be
tested by creating either a random-effects or a fixed-
effects regression model. A random-effects model
assumes that the individual effects are uncorrelated
with the regressors and that the individual specific
constant terms are randomly distributed across cross-
sectional units. This greatly reduces the number of
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics for Subsystem Level Variables
Variable description Mean SD Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) Error rate 0.345 0.128 0.092 0.705 1
(2) Product network centrality 0.186 0.159 0.084 0.588 0.093 1
(3) Global distribution score 2.961 0.873 1.38 5.93 0.156 0.071 1
(4) Number of parts 208.7 16.41 136 318 0.002 0.013 0.008 1
(5) Fraction of new parts 0.319 0.184 0.098 0.625 0.297 0.014 0.011 0.003 1
(6) Number of design engineers 136.7 34.074 39 306 0.005 0.028 0.185 0.005 0.021 1
(7) Number of ECOs 265.9 25.76 108 384 0.082 0.169 0.083 0.016 0.142 0.295 1
(8) Fraction of late ECOs 0.198 0. 204 0.045 0.388 0.181 0.107 0.215 0.010 0.092 0.119 0.008 1
All correlation coefficients above |0.08| are significant at p < 0.01 level.
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parameters to be estimated, which makes it appropri-
ate for data sets with large cross sections and small
time units (i.e., repeated observations) (Greene 2008).
In contrast, a fixed-effects model specifically accounts
for the omitted effects which are correlated with the
included variables. However, the fixed-effects model
is costly in terms of degrees of freedom lost, as it
introduces fixed effects for each cross-sectional unit.
Because our data set included a large cross section
of observations (i.e., 243 subsystems), with limited
time units (i.e., only four vehicle programs), a ran-
dom-effects model is best suited for our purposes. We
confirmed this with the Hausman specification test
(Hausman 1978) of the choice between a random-
effects and a fixed-effects specification, and resulted
in a test statistic of v2 ¼ 6:85, which is not significant
at the 0.05 level (p > 0.05). Therefore, we do not reject
the null hypothesis, which was that random-effects
and fixed-effects estimates do not differ significantly.
Consequently, we picked the more efficient and con-
sistent random-effects model over the fixed-effects
model and used generalized least squares (GLS) to
analyze it.
Table 4 provides the results of the hierarchical ran-
dom-effects model for error rates. Model 2a includes
all base variables, while Models 2b and 2c add the
product network centrality and global distribution score
separately. Finally, Model 2e includes all variables
including the interaction of product network central-
ity and global distribution score.
Model 2b indicates that product network centrality is
significant (b = 0.185, p < 0.05) and has a positive
impact on the error rate. Moreover, a partial F test
indicates that Model 2b provides significant improve-
ment over Model 2a for predicting the error rates.
This provides support for Hypothesis 2 that higher
subsystem centrality is associated with higher error
rates. The global distribution score is also significant
(p < 0.01) in Model 2c, which supports Hypothesis 3.
Also, the partial F statistic is 122.95 (p < 0.01), which
suggests that adding the global distribution score
improved the fit from Model 2a to 2c. The implication
is that as subsystems get more global, the error rate
increases significantly. Next, Model 2d includes both
product network centrality and global distribution score.
Both variables are again significant at p < 0.05 and
p < 0.01 levels, respectively, and the partial F test
indicates a significant improvement with the addition
of both variables (Model 2d) over Model 2c.
Finally, in the presence of both the direct effects of
product network centrality and global distribution score,
the interaction term product network centrality 9 global
distribution score is also significant at the p < 0.01 level,
which provides evidence for Hypothesis 4. The partial
F statistic between Model 2d and Model 2e is
calculated to be 7.893 (p < 0.01), which suggests that
adding the interaction term has improved the explan-
atory power of the model significantly. This supports
Hypothesis 4 that product network centrality ampli-
fies the relationship between global distribution score
and error rates.
To further examine the conjectured amplifying
effect, we plotted the interaction between product net-
work centrality and global distribution score in Figure 1.
Using our sample, we identified the values of one
Table 4 Random-Effects Model for Error Rate
Variable Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c Model 2d Model 2e
Number of parts 0.002 (0.012) 0.003 (0.014) 0.003 (0.013) 0.003 (0.013) 0.003 (0.014)
Fraction of new parts 0.788** (0.342) 0.790** (0.346 ) 0.782** (0.344) 0.788** (0.345) 0.785** (0.347)
Number of design engineers 0.004* (0.002) 0.003* (0.002) 0.004* (0.002) 0.004* (0.002) 0.004* (0.002)
Number of ECOs 0.002 (0.011) 0.002 (0.010) 0.003 (0.008) 0.002 (0.009) 0.003 (0.007)
Fraction of late ECOs 0.348** (0.166) 0.361** (0.181) 0.368* (0.195) 0.352** (0.0176) 0.373* (0.199)
Product network centrality 0.185** (0.077) 0.181** (0.076) 0.176** (0.083)
Global distribution score 0.042*** (0.013) 0.040*** (0.014) 0.039*** (0.014)
Product network centrality 9 global
distribution
0.114*** (0.041)
F statistic for the partial F-test 82.41*** 122.95*** 7.837*** 7.893***
Adjusted R2 29.7% 35.2% 37.6% 38.3% 38.9%
n 972














Figure 1 The Impact of Subsystem Centrality on the Relationship
Between Global Distribution Score and Error Rate
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standard deviation above and below of the means of
subsystem centrality and global distribution (i.e., four
points with high centrality and high distribution, high
centrality and low distribution, low centrality and
high distribution, low centrality and low distribution)
and obtained the corresponding error rates. We then
plotted these in Figure 1 to visually confirm the inter-
action effect. Consistent with Hypothesis 4 and the
results of Model 2e, there is a strong positive relation-
ship between global distribution score and error rates
when the subsystem has high product network cen-
trality. That is, when highly central subsystems are
distributed globally, they experience higher error
rates. In contrast, we observe a slightly negative rela-
tionship between global distribution score and error
rates for low centrality subsystems. That is, when low
centrality subsystems are distributed globally, they
experience lower error rates. This is consistent with
our conjecture that the “coordination burden” domi-
nates for highly central subsystems, so error rate
increases as the global distribution score increases. In
contrast, the “specialization benefit” dominates for
low centrality subsystems, so the error rate decreases
as the global distribution score increases.
Model 4 also reveals that the fraction of new parts is a
significant predictor of the error rates of the subsys-
tems. This is not surprising, as new parts imply a
learning curve and hence more errors. Also, the frac-
tion of new parts may be a good indicator of task diffi-
culty within the subsystems. Interestingly, the number
of design engineers is significant but with a negative
coefficient. That is, error rate in a subsystem decreases
as the number of design engineers increases. We conjec-
ture that this is a consequence of more engineers in a
subsystem providing more pairs of eyes to catch
design errors. But our results also imply that this
reduction in error rate comes with a price in terms of
task delay. That is, the positive association of number of
design engineers and probability of task delay in Table 2
suggests that more engineers lead to higher task delay.
Finally, the fraction of late ECOs has a negative and
significant coefficient. This indicates that, if engineers
in a subsystem are not pressured to complete design
tasks on time (resulting in a higher fraction of late
ECOs), they may be able to achieve a lower rate of
errors. In short, our data suggest a trade-off between
higher on-time performance and lower error rates.
To examine the robustness of our results, we exam-
ined potential endogeneity issues in our analysis.
First, as with any random-effects model, if the unob-
served individual heterogeneity is correlated with the
explanatory variables, this may introduce an endoge-
neity problem and therefore lead to potentially incon-
sistent estimates. To check this, we created a fixed-
effects model in which we introduced a dummy vari-
able for each subsystem. This enabled us to better
control for any unobserved subsystem-specific char-
acteristics. We examined the model coefficients of this
fixed-effects regression and found that all estimates
are within the 10% confidence interval of our ran-
dom-effects estimates, and all significant estimates of
the random-effects model are still significant at the
same levels. Therefore, the fixed-effects specification
does not change our results. While this fixed-effects
specification alleviates the major concerns regarding
endogeneity, it does not rule it out entirely. For exam-
ple, one could argue that a third factor such as com-
plexity could affect both subsystem centrality and
error rates, or reverse causality could be a concern as
higher error rates might lead to greater global distri-
bution of a subsystem. Ideally, the first concern (i.e., a
third factor affecting both centrality and error rates)
could have beeen addressed via a two stage least
squares (2SLS) estimate using instrumental variables.
Unfortunately, we were unable to find strong and
suitable instruments to use in a 2SLS regression in
our data. So, instead, in our model, we controlled for
a variety of factors such as the number of parts, the
number of design engineers, and the number of ECOs that
might act as proxies for subsystem complexity. We
also controlled for individual subsystem characteris-
tics (by introducing dummies) in our additional
fixed-effects regression. Finally, we can rule out
potential reverse causality between global distribu-
tion and error rates because the distribution of an
ECO is determined at the beginning of the process,
whereas errors occur only after engineers start work-
ing on their parts. So, global distribution clearly pre-
cedes errors.
To get a sense of the economic significance of our
main explanatory variables, we changed their values
by one standard deviation and calculated the associ-
ated effect on error rate. A one standard deviation
increase in product network centrality results in a
100 9 (0.159 9 0.176)/0.345 = 8.1% increase in error
rate. Similarly, a one standard deviation increase in
the global distribution score results in a 100 9
(0.873 9 0.039)/0.345 = 9.8% increase in error rate.
These effects are quite substantial considering the
waste and cost associated with making design related
errors.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
The impact of globally distributed work and the role
of geographic distance on knowledge transmission
have been studied by management scholars. Most of
these earlier studies have focused on the behavioral
and cultural characteristics of distributed work and
their implications. This study contributes to our
understanding of global product development by
examining the operational impact of global distribu-
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tion on speed and accuracy of the design process.
We found that increasing the degree of global distri-
bution of a design task makes it less likely to be
completed on time. Specifically, our results indicate
that globalization leads to missed due dates, not just
longer task times, which suggests that management
tends to underestimate the impact of globalization
on development times when setting due dates.
Although one of the reasons for companies to
engage in global design activities is to improve
operational efficiency, our results suggest that this
may not be the case. If a design task is distributed
among several global locations, coordination is likely
to be a key challenge even in the presence of com-
puterized systems designed to facilitate communica-
tion and collaboration. Even after controlling for the
number of design engineers involved and the sub-
system associated with the task, we observed that
there is a positive association between the number
of global sites involved and the chance of an ECO
being late.
We also examined the role of product architecture
and global distribution on the performance of engi-
neering design efforts at the subsystem level. Our
results suggest that the location of a subsystem in the
product architecture network may affect the quality
of the design work in that subsystem. As a subsystem
becomes more central in the network (i.e., it involves
more interfaces and dependencies with other subsys-
tems), the error rate in that subsystem increases sub-
stantially. Our study provides an innovative way to
measure the strength of these interdependencies via
standard data from an engineering change order sys-
tem. As such, it may help managers to assess some of
complex interdependencies present in their product
architecture and the associated risks of global distri-
bution of design activities.
Our results regarding the role of global distribution
of subsystems implies that global distribution could
be detrimental to design quality. After controlling for
such factors as fraction of new parts or the number of
design engineers, we found that increasing the global
distribution of a subsystem leads to higher error rates.
Moreover, we found that central subsystems in the
product network are particularly vulnerable to this
negative effect of global distribution. Spreading cen-
tral subsystems across multiple design locations is
likely to lead to high rates of errors. As these errors
increase cost (i.e., a part with a design mistake must
be re-done) and have the potential to cause delay in
product launches, product development managers
should keep a close eye on subsystems that are highly
central and globally distributed. Indeed, it may make
sense not to globally distribute subsystems with high
centrality and instead assign their design to a single
location or divide their design among only a few
locations. This type of concentrated design assign-
ment may help the product development organiza-
tion better coordinate the many interdependent tasks
associated with highly central subsystems.
Although distributed design has received consider-
able attention in recent years, our understanding of
some forms of distributed organizational arrange-
ments and their performance implications are limited.
Research in organizational arrangements such as out-
sourcing or off-shoring is relatively well developed,
but the phenomenon of in-house globalization has not
yet received much attention. Integration of knowl-
edge-intensive operations across multiple global loca-
tions and management of these operations within a
firm are significant challenges that call for further
study by scholars from multiple disciplines. Using a
unique data set and innovative metrics, we have
empirically tested the impact of product architecture
and global distribution on design performance. As
such, our study extends the knowledge of distributed
design efforts and provides conceptual insights into
globalized in-house design. Our work is also of practi-
cal relevance to product development managers, as
we make use of a standard database that is readily
available to many product development organiza-
tions.
Our work points to several potential directions for
future research. We examined the role of product
architecture and global distribution on product
development performance. The impact of these vari-
ables on end product quality, as well as the inter-
play between these product design metrics and
manufacturing, could be investigated. Also, we only
considered development efforts for one model year,
due to data limitations. A longitudinal study that
captures the dynamic nature of product design
efforts and monitors the improvements over time
could reveal the sensitivity of performance to shifts
in the degree of product distribution. Another obvi-
ous direction for future research is complementing
this study with more detailed ethnographic studies
of distributed work. This would facilitate investiga-
tion of informal communication practices of design
engineers and the interplay between geographic
location and product architecture on informal com-
munication and performance via a survey instru-
ment. Another avenue for study could be to
examine how coordination across different pairs of
global locations vary (e.g., coordinating between the
United States and Canada vs. the United States and
India) and how this might affect product develop-
ment performance. Finally, like many empirical
studies, this work primarily relies on data from one
company in a specific industry (i.e., automotive); it
remains to be seen whether our results extend to
other settings and industries.
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Notes
1Note that the independent variable “fraction of problem-
atic ECOs” in Gokpinar et al. (2010) is identical to the
dependent variable “error rate” here. We use the term
“error rate” to better convey the role of the variable in our
model.
2In subsequent analysis, we found that there is no differ-
ence between vehicle programs in their effect on subsys-
tem error rates. Therefore, for parsimony, we did not
include these dummy variables in our final regression.
3As we have 10 countries, we used nine dummies and one
reference country. We used stepwise regressions and
several different model specifications such as having the
United States as the reference category, or Mexico or
Canada as the reference. We observed that when the
United States is the reference, although their coefficients
are quite small, all of the country dummies were positive
and significant. But when we used one of the other coun-
tries as the reference, only the United States had a signifi-
cant and negative coefficient. So, we only included the
United States in our final model, and we concluded that
ECOs originated in the United States are more likely to be
on time relative to those originated in other countries.
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